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ABSTRACT
Conventional implicatures are omnipresent in daily life communication
but experimental research on this topic is sparse, especially research
with children. The aim of this study was to investigate if eight- to
twelve-year-old children spontaneously make the conventional
implicature induced by but, so, and nevertheless in ‘p but q’ sentences.
Additionally, the study aimed to shed light on the cognitive eﬀort
required for these inferences by measuring working memory (WM)
capacity. Our results show that children do make these inferences to a
certain extent, but are sensitive to the content of the arguments. We
found a signiﬁcant eﬀect of sentence type, but did not observe any
developmental eﬀect, nor any eﬀect of WM: a higher age or WM
capacity does not result in more pragmatic inferences.
INTRODUCTION
Within the ﬁeld of pragmatics, a large body of experimental research has
been devoted to implicatures. The majority of this research has focused on
the category of conversational implicatures. A conversational implicature is
“a component of speaker meaning that constitutes an aspect of what is
meant in a speaker’s utterance without being part of what is said” (Horn,
, p. ). A widely investigated subtype of conversational implicatures is
the scalar implicature. The scalar implicature arising from a sentence like
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some children are naughty is that ‘some but not all children are naughty’. In
contrast to this pragmatic interpretation, this utterance can also be
interpreted logically: ‘some and perhaps all children are naughty’. However,
the general assumption is that, whenever a weaker term (e.g. the quantiﬁer
some) is used, a stronger term from the same scale (e.g. all) does not hold, or
that the speaker does not know whether it holds, because otherwise they
would be underinformative. This interpretation can be applied to a range of
diﬀerent scales (e.g. <always, often, sometimes>, <three, two, one>, etc.).
In this paper, however, we will focus on the other category of implicatures,
conventional implicatures, which have received much less attention in the
literature. Unlike conversational implicatures, conventional implicatures
are related to the conventional meaning of words. A typical example is
that but conventionally implies a contrast. In an utterance such as he is
short, but he is healthy, the use of but suggests that there is a contrast between
‘short’ and ‘healthy’, even though this contrast is not explicitly expressed.
Grice () introduced the concept ‘conventional implicature’ to describe
conventional aspects of meaning that are not truth-conditional. For example:
() a. He is short but he is healthy.
b. He is short and he is healthy.
Truth-conditionally, (a) and (b) have the same meaning. However, but
is not a truth-conditional connector because but provides an additional
meaning to the utterance in (a). It suggests that there is a contrast between
the ﬁrst and the second clause. This additional feature of but is what Grice
describes as a conventional implicature. However, within the context of
relevance theory, Blakemore () proposed a procedural analysis of but,
which can be summarized as follows:
To say that but means denial is to say that it encodes a constraint that
triggers an inferential route involving contradicting and eliminating an
assumption that is manifest in the context. (in Hall, , p. )
Thus, according to Blakemore, but encodes a speciﬁc procedure. This
procedural analysis conﬂicts with Grice’s conceptual analysis in which but
encodes the concept ‘contrast’.
The experiment discussed in this paper focuses on the conventional
implicature induced by the conjunction but. This work builds on Janssens
and Schaeken (), but focuses on children instead of adults. Janssens
and Schaeken () investigated ‘p but q’ utterances constructed as
distancing-contrastive connections. In a distancing contrast, but connects
two parts of a complex speech act (Van Belle & Devroy, ) and the second
part is disassociated from the ﬁrst part, without denying what the latter
expresses (Haeseryn, Romijn, Geerts, De Rooij & van den Toorn, ).
In the ‘p but q’ construction, the speaker endorses that p is true
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(Van Belle, ). However, because but is used, the possible inference from
p is cancelled in favour of the conclusion stemming from q. The but construc-
tion indicates that the q-argument should be considered more relevant than
the inference made from p. For example:
() I really like chocolate, but it’s almost dinner time.
In a context where someone is oﬀered a piece of chocolate, the two arguments
of () lead to opposite conclusions. The ﬁrst part (p) of this sentence elicits
the conclusion that the speaker will eat the piece of chocolate, whereas the
q-argument yields the opposite conclusion, i.e. that the speaker will not
eat the chocolate. In this construction, but not only indicates that there is a
contrast between the two arguments, it also provides more weight to the
q-argument. The conclusion from the q-argument is therefore the pragmatic
conclusion that follows from but. In other words, by uttering () the prag-
matic conclusion is that the speaker will not eat the chocolate. Note that
when the arguments are reversed (i.e. it’s almost dinner time, but I really
like chocolate), the opposite conclusion will follow, i.e. that the speaker will
eat the chocolate.
The conclusion that follows from the ‘p but q’ construction can be
introduced by words like so or nevertheless. These two words elicit opposite
conclusions. When the word so follows a ‘p argumentative but q’ utterance,
it introduces the expected conclusion from q (e.g. I really like chocolate, but
it’s almost dinner time. So I won’t eat chocolate.). In contrast, Lepère ()
argued that, according to Van Belle (), the word nevertheless, used
as a conjunctive adverb, reverses the argumentative orientation of a
‘p argumentative but q’ sentence. It overrules the conclusion from q and
redirects the reader towards the conclusion implied by p (e.g. I really like
chocolate, but it’s almost dinner time. Nevertheless, I will eat chocolate.).
Note that the argumentative strength of but, so, and nevertheless should
be considered separate from the content of the arguments, which they are
supposed to take precedence over (Van Belle, ).
Janssens and Schaeken () presented adult participants with short
stories, each ending with a ‘p but q’ sentence. The p- and q-arguments
were either sensible or irrelevant and always led to opposite conclusions.
For instance, ‘I really like chocolate’ and ‘it’s almost dinner time’ are both
sensible arguments (for eating and not eating chocolate, respectively).
However, in this context – in which someone is oﬀered a piece of
chocolate – ‘I have blonde hair’ would be an example of an irrelevant
argument. An irrelevant argument has no relation with the story and in no
[] The experiment described in this paper was carried out in Dutch. Throughout this paper
we use ‘nevertheless’ to translate Dutch toch, even though these two adverbs do not have
the exact same meaning.
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way indicates which conclusion should follow. Such irrelevant arguments
were included in order to investigate whether people might be inﬂuenced
by the content of the arguments rather than the structure of the sentence
(i.e. the pragmatic meaning of but).
After participants read the ‘p but q’ sentence, they were asked to indicate
the appropriate conclusion introduced by so (‘so conclusion from p’ or ‘so
conclusion from q’) for one half of the stories, and the one introduced by
nevertheless (‘nevertheless conclusion from p’ or ‘nevertheless conclusion
from q’) for the other half. The ‘appropriate’ pragmatic conclusion
introduced by so is the one stemming from the q-argument, while for
nevertheless this is the one from the p-argument. The results showed that,
in general, people do make the inference induced by but. This was clear
from the items with two sensible arguments for which the so-conclusion
was asked (% pragmatic answers). In contrast, for the nevertheless-
conclusions, the expected conclusions from p were given in only % of
the cases. This could indicate that the meaning of nevertheless does not
give as much precedence to the p-argument as was expected. On the other
hand, this latter ﬁnding could also be explained by the fact that the inference
stemming from nevertheless is opposite to the one from but. In a ‘p but q’
construction, but leads the reader towards the conclusion from q, but
nevertheless overrules this conclusion in favour of the conclusion from p.
This understandably requires more eﬀort than a so-conclusion, which
explains why the number of appropriate answers was lower for nevertheless.
The content of the arguments was also found to play an important role.
Whenever an irrelevant argument was combined with a sensible argument,
most participants favoured the conclusion from the sensible argument,
regardless of the conventional meaning of but, so, or nevertheless. The
importance of the content was conﬁrmed in a second experiment in which
participants were asked to justify their answer. As expected, whenever
their conclusion was not the pragmatic one, participants mostly explained
this by referring to the content of the arguments.
This paper investigates whether the pragmatic meaning of but, combined
with so and nevertheless, is also clear to children. In conversational
implicature research, it has been shown that children are less able to make
pragmatic inferences than adults. For example, Noveck () found that
% of the seven- to eight-year-olds in his study agreed with statements
such as some giraﬀes have long necks, compared to only % of the adults.
Similarly, with respect to propositional connectives, Braine and Rumain
() presented evidence that deductively competent seven- and
nine-year-old children favour a logical interpretation of or (‘p or q and
perhaps both’) over an implicit one (‘p or q but not both’). Adults given
the same task were equivocal, although they tended to favour exclusive
interpretations (Braine & Rumain, ). Such observations that children
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are less able to make pragmatic inferences than adults have led to further
research into factors that enhance children’s pragmatic competence. For
example, in an experiment with ﬁve-year-old children, Papafragou and
Musolino () found that a training session prior to the presentation of
the test sentences in order to enhance the children’s awareness of pragmatic
anomalies caused the number of pragmatic answers to increase.
For conventional implicatures, we also expect that children are less able to
make pragmatic inferences than adults. This is because there is a certain
similarity between conversational implicatures and the conventional
implicatures investigated in our experiment. A speciﬁc feature of
conventional implicatures – in contrast with conversational implicatures – is
that they are not cancellable. However, but sentences seem to carry two
implicatures. First, there is the implicature that but creates a contrast
between p and q (e.g. he is short, but he is healthy), which indeed seems to
be a classic, non-cancellable conventional implicature. However, this is not
the case for the second implicature, i.e. that but provides more weight to
the q-argument (e.g. I really like chocolate, but it’s almost dinner time). The
use of nevertheless, for example, can lead to a cancellation of this implicature
as it provides more weight to the p-argument in a ‘p but q’ utterance.
Accordingly, the conventional implicatures that we investigate in this
paper may not be purely conventional, but they share certain features with
conversational implicatures. That is why we expect similar results for the
conventional implicature task with but, i.e. that children are less able to
make these pragmatic inferences.
The typical pragmatic development in children for conversational
implicatures is often explained by the fact that drawing the implicature
requires eﬀort and children have less cognitive resources available than
adults. Cognitive eﬀort in adults has been tested by De Neys and
Schaeken (), among others, who found that burdening working memory
(WM) with a secondary task decreases pragmatic processing. Together with
other observations (e.g. Bott & Noveck, ; Noveck & Posada, ), this
was taken as evidence that scalar implicature processing is eﬀortful. Since the
conventional implicatures we investigate in this paper have certain properties
in common with conversational implicatures (i.e. they are cancellable), we
also examined whether WM plays a role in processing these implicatures.
In addition to testing children’s understanding of the pragmatic meaning
of but, so, and nevertheless, we also measured whether a higher WM span
corresponds with a better understanding of the pragmatic meaning of but,
so, and nevertheless.
Adults had been found to clearly grasp the pragmatic meaning of but.
However, they also proved to be inﬂuenced by the content of the arguments,
in spite of their pragmatic competence. For this reason, it is plausible to
expect that children will deﬁnitely show great sensitivity to the content of
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the arguments in ‘p but q’ constructions. This expectation is based on
the similarity between conversational implicatures and the conventional
implicatures focused on in this paper, but this expectation can also be
deduced from the ﬁndings of Schaeken, Sevenants, and Madruga
(), who observed a clear eﬀect of content in children. For nine- to
thirteen-year-old children, who were given a reasoning task with unless,
abstract problems proved to be much more diﬃcult to grasp than concrete
problems. The concrete, meaningful problems were about daily life
situations that could easily be imagined in a realistic context (e.g. you will
have to go to bed early, unless you make no more mistakes) whereas the abstract
problems concerned cards with letters on one side and numbers on the
other side (e.g. there is a ‘’, unless there is not an ‘A’). This suggests that
for children to be able to reason with unless, they need to be presented
with a meaningful context that is imaginable in real life. Children seem to
need meaning to reason. We therefore expect the children in our experiment
to be greatly inﬂuenced by the type of sentence, and more speciﬁcally by the
content of the arguments. We expect that when children see an argument
that they judge as a very strong argument in its context, the content of the
arguments will often prevail over the conventional meaning of but, so, and
nevertheless. In particular, the combination of sensible arguments with
irrelevant arguments is likely to make a diﬀerence. Furthermore, the inter-
action between the type of argument (sensible or irrelevant) and the type
of conclusion (so or nevertheless) observed in adults can also be expected in
children. We expect the irrelevant arguments to facilitate the so-conclusions
in the ‘irrelevant but sensible’ contexts, and the nevertheless-conclusions
in the ‘sensible but irrelevant’ contexts. Moreover, since adults were found
to have great diﬃculty with nevertheless, we expect these conclusions to be
especially diﬃcult for children.
METHOD
Participants
A total of  children ( boys and  girls) between eight and twelve years
old, with a mean age of ;, participated in this study. They were selected
from two diﬀerent schools in Belgium and were all native Dutch speakers.
Working memory task
In order to relate the results of the implicature task to the children’s
WM span, we measured WM by means of a Listening Span task
(Daneman & Carpenter, ). In the Listening Span task, the children
heard the experimenter read utterances aloud and were asked to write
down whether these utterances were true or false. In addition, they had to
remember the last word of every utterance and write these words down in
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the correct order at the end of each trial. They started with three trials
with a listening span of one utterance. The span length was increased by
one utterance whenever the children wrote the words down in the correct
order in at least two of the three trials. Every increase of the listening
span was announced by the experimenter in order to reduce the eﬀect of
attentional factors. Whenever at least two out of three trials were written
down incorrectly, the Listening Span task was terminated. A trial was scored
as correct when all the words of this trial were written down in the correct
order. The total score was the sum of all correct trials.
Implicature task
The implicature task consisted of eighteen context stories that were adopted
from Janssens and Schaeken (). Each of the stories described a person in
doubt about something. For example:
It’s Christmas. The ‘De Corte’ family bought a Christmas tree and want to
decorate it. Mom is in doubt whether to let her youngest daughter Sarah help.
After the short story, the person in doubt gives two contrastive arguments
separated by but. For example:
Mom thinks: “Sarah likes decorating the tree, but she is very clumsy.”
The arguments were either sensible or irrelevant. In the example above, both
arguments are sensible. These sensible arguments have an argumentative
orientation determined by either a positive or negative value that we ascribe
to its content, which is referred to as the ‘axiological value’ by Anscombre
and Ducrot (). A positive argument (e.g. Sarah likes decorating the
tree) is an argument of which the axiological value is oriented towards a
positive conclusion (e.g. ‘Sarah can help’), while a negative argument (e.g.
she is very clumsy) elicits a negative conclusion (e.g. ‘Sarah cannot help’).
The irrelevant arguments have no positive or negative axiological value,
i.e. they are not oriented towards a positive or negative conclusion. An
example of an irrelevant argument in this context is the following:
Mom thinks: “Sarah is very clumsy, but she is wearing pink pyjamas.”
In total, there were six combinations of arguments: ‘positive sensible but
negative sensible’, ‘negative sensible but positive sensible’, ‘irrelevant
but positive sensible’, ‘irrelevant but negative sensible’, ‘positive sensible
but irrelevant’, and ‘negative sensible but irrelevant’. There was no ‘irrel-
evant but irrelevant’ combination because if both arguments are unrelated
to the context of the story, there is no way to know what the conclusion
should be. See Table  for an example from the Christmas story of every
sentence type.
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After participants read the ‘p but q’ construction, they were asked to
choose the appropriate conclusion. For half the stories, they had to choose
the appropriate conclusion introduced by so, and for the other half of the
stories the appropriate conclusion introduced by nevertheless. For example:
. “So Sarah can help.”
. “So Sarah cannot help.”
or:
. “Nevertheless Sarah can help.”
. “Nevertheless Sarah cannot help.”
The appropriate pragmatic conclusion with so is the conclusion that follows
from the q-argument, whereas the expected appropriate conclusion with
nevertheless is the conclusion resulting from the p-argument.
Procedure
First, the Listening Span task was conducted with groups of ﬁve or six
children at the same time. This task was performed in their classroom at
school. In order to familiarize the children with the task, they were given
three training trials, followed by the real task. Then, all children completed
the implicature task. This was an individual written task which all children
performed simultaneously in their classroom at school. Each participant
answered three items from each argument combination, with half the
items consisting of so questions and the other half of nevertheless questions.
RESULTS
In order to analyze whether children made the correct inferences, we made
no distinction between positive and negative arguments. There is no reason
to expect that one would be more diﬃcult than the other, as was conﬁrmed
by the ﬁnding that separate analyses did not present any signiﬁcant
diﬀerences. Therefore, for our analyses, we collapsed the items to the
TABLE  . Example of each sentence type
Sentence type Example
pos S but neg S Sarah likes decorating the tree, but she is very clumsy.
neg S but pos S Sarah is very clumsy, but she likes decorating the tree.
I but pos S Sarah is wearing pink pyjamas, but she likes decorating the tree.
I but neg S Sarah is wearing pink pyjamas, but she is very clumsy.
pos S but I Sarah likes decorating the tree, but she is wearing pink pyjamas.
neg S but I Sarah is very clumsy, but she is wearing pink pyjamas.
NOTES: pos=positive; neg=negative; S=sensible; I=irrelevant.
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combinations: ‘sensible but sensible’, ‘irrelevant but sensible’, and ‘sensible
but irrelevant’. Since children always had a one out of two chance of giving
the expected answer, we also analyzed whether their performance diﬀered
signiﬁcantly from chance level. The results, displayed in Table , show that
performance on each sentence type diﬀered signiﬁcantly from chance level.
Performance on the sentence types ‘sensible but sensible, so’, ‘irrelevant
but sensible, so’ and ‘sensible but irrelevant, nevertheless’ was signiﬁcantly
above chance level and performance on all other sentence types was signiﬁ-
cantly below chance level (‘sensible but irrelevant, so’, ‘sensible but sensible,
nevertheless’, and ‘irrelevant but sensible, nevertheless’).
Since participants were nested in diﬀerent age groups and the dependent
variable was binary, a generalized linear mixed model (also known as
multilevel or hierarchical linear modelling) with a logit link function was
used to analyze the data (see, e.g. Baayen, Davidson & Bates, ; Bates,
Maechler & Bolker, ; or Jaeger, ). The model ﬁtting procedure
was implemented in R using the lmer() function from the lme package.
The model was made increasingly complex until model ﬁt no longer
increased, which was assessed using the Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC). The ﬁnal model includes an eﬀect of sentence type, but no main
eﬀects of age or WM capacity, nor interactions of these variables with
sentence type.
In addition, we analyzed correlations between WM span and performance
on the six sentence type categories. All correlations were non-signiﬁcant,
with no correlation above ·.
Table  displays an overview of the ﬁnal model. The ‘irrelevant but
sensible, nevertheless’ sentences are presented as the intercept with which
all other sentence types are compared. We found that performance on
these sentences did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from ‘sensible but irrelevant, so’
nor from ‘sensible but sensible, nevertheless’. The performance on all
other sentence types did, however, diﬀer signiﬁcantly from ‘irrelevant but
sensible, nevertheless’.
TABLE  . Percentages of appropriate so- and nevertheless-conclusions for
each sentence type
Sentence type Percentage of appropriate answers (N=)
SS_so ·***
IS_so ·***
SI_so ·***
SS_nevertheless ·**
IS_nevertheless ·***
SI_nevertheless ·***
NOTES: I=irrelevant; S=sensible; * p< ·, ** p< ·, *** p< ·.
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Table  shows further pairwise comparisons for the diﬀerent levels of
sentence type. These were obtained by applying the multcomp package’s
glht() function on the ﬁnal model. The reported p values were adjusted for
multiple comparisons using the single-step method. For the so-conclusions,
the best results were obtained for the ‘irrelevant but sensible’ sentences.
Performance on these sentences did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the ‘sensible
but sensible, so’ sentences, but both sentence types did diﬀer signiﬁcantly
from the ‘sensible but irrelevant, so’ sentences. For the nevertheless-
conclusions, performance was very good on the ‘sensible but irrelevant’
sentences and the number of appropriate answers diﬀered signiﬁcantly
from ‘sensible but sensible, nevertheless’ and ‘irrelevant but sensible,
nevertheless’. Finally, when we compare performance on so-conclusions
with nevertheless-conclusions, the children assessed so-conclusions signiﬁ-
cantly more accurately than nevertheless-conclusions when presented with
two sensible arguments.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The aim of this paper was to determine whether children make the
conventional implicature induced by but in ‘p but q’ constructions combined
TABLE  . Parameter estimates for the model with sentence type as a predictor
Predictor Estimate Standard Error Z p-value
Intercept (IS_nevertheless) −· · −· <·***
SI_nevertheless · · · <·***
SS_nevertheless · · · ·
SS_so · · · <·***
SI_so · · · ·
IS_so · · · <·***
NOTES: I=irrelevant; S=sensible; * p< ·, ** p< ·, *** p< ·.
TABLE  . Pairwise comparisons for the diﬀerent sentence types
Comparison Estimate Standard Error Z p-value
SS_so – IS_so −· · −· ·
SI_so – IS_so −· · −· <·***
SS_so – SI_so · · · <·***
SS_so – SS_nevertheless · · · ·**
SS_nevertheless – SI_nevertheless −· · −· <·***
SS_nevertheless – IS_nevertheless · · · ·
IS_nevertheless – SI_nevertheless · · · <·***
NOTES: I=irrelevant; S=sensible; * p< ·, ** p< ·, *** p< ·.
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with so and nevertheless. While this had already been investigated in adults,
no data were available on children’s abilities to make these inferences.
A group of eight- to twelve-year-old children took part in our experiment.
Furthermore, we wanted to address the question whether conventional
implicature production is aﬀected by WM span. Given their similarities
with conversational implicatures, we examined whether processing these
implicatures is eﬀortful. To that end, we measured WM span by means of
a Listening Span task.
The data were analyzed using a generalized linear mixed model,
which showed that there was a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of sentence type, but
no signiﬁcant main eﬀect of age or WM, nor any interaction between the
two. When analyzing how the children performed compared to chance (see
Table ), we see that all results diﬀered signiﬁcantly from chance level.
The children performed signiﬁcantly below chance level on most of the
sentences with nevertheless. Only the ‘sensible but irrelevant, nevertheless’
sentences were answered fairly accurately. This is because the appropriate
answer for these items corresponds with the sensible argument, while the
irrelevant argument can be ignored. On the ‘sensible but irrelevant, so’
sentences, children also scored signiﬁcantly lower than chance level. In
this case following the sensible argument (and ignoring the irrelevant one)
does not yield the appropriate answer. Given that all results diﬀered
signiﬁcantly from chance level, we can conclude that children purposefully
chose the inappropriate answer because they believed it to be the appropriate
one, not because they were guessing. The results above chance level
performance suggest that the meaning of but was fairly clear to the children,
but they had diﬃculty grasping the meaning of nevertheless. This explains
why they mostly chose the conclusion from q, to which they were directed
by but, and not the appropriate conclusion from p. Moreover, this suggests
that the content of the arguments is a very important factor, explaining
the poor performance on ‘sensible but irrelevant, so’ and ‘irrelevant but
sensible, nevertheless’.
In general, our results showed that children are able to make the inference
induced by but to a certain extent, but the percentages are rather low.
Compared with the results obtained by Janssens and Schaeken (), the
percentages of pragmatic answers in children, given the exact same task,
were clearly lower than in adults. This suggests that children’s pragmatic
understanding of but is not yet fully developed. Since even adults were
found to be inﬂuenced by the content of the arguments, these results also
indicate that this has even more of an impact on children. By comparing
[] As could be expected, age and WM correlated signiﬁcantly. According to Gathercole
(), WM further improves through development and only reaches asymptotic levels
at age twelve.
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the performance on the diﬀerent sentence types, this was made very clear. In
the ‘p but q’ constructions that contained an irrelevant argument, children
mainly based their answers on the sensible argument, irrespective of the
conventional meaning of but, so, or nevertheless. However, not only the
irrelevant situations provided evidence that children are sensitive to content.
Whenever two sensible arguments were presented and the so-conclusion was
asked, children only provided % pragmatic answers (compared to %
for the adults). This seems to indicate that their answer is often based on
the argument they themselves deem most plausible and not necessarily on
the q-argument.
Another parallel with the results of the adults is that the percentage of
expected nevertheless-conclusions from the p-argument (following two
sensible arguments) is very low: only %. As was argued in Janssens and
Schaeken (), this could indicate that the assumed meaning of nevertheless,
as reversing the expected conclusion from but, might not be correct. However,
these results might also be explained by the additional eﬀort required to
make the correct interpretation. Since nevertheless requires the reader to ﬁrst
make the inference from but, and then overrule this inference to draw the
conclusion from the p-argument, it seems likely that this whole process
might be more eﬀortful than simply drawing the so-conclusion.
In order to determine whether processing the conventional implicature
with but is eﬀortful, we related the results of the implicature task to a WM
test. Surprisingly, we found no eﬀect of WM span, nor an eﬀect of age.
We expected these factors to play a signiﬁcant role based on the similarity
of this speciﬁc conventional implicature with conversational implicatures.
It is important to mention that the absence of a WM eﬀect cannot be
attributed to the WM task. The WM scores ranged between  and  with
a standard deviation of ·. This means that there was enough variability
to identify a possible eﬀect. The lack of an eﬀect of WM (or age) may suggest
that, in contrast to conversational implicatures, processing this implicature
happens automatically and requires no WM. However, before drawing
such a strong conclusion, we have to keep in mind that the eﬀect of WM
for conversational implicatures, although signiﬁcant, is only small (see, e.g.
De Neys & Schaeken, ). WM involvement must be small in order to
ensure smooth communication. Furthermore, when Dieussaert, Verkerk,
Gillard, and Schaeken () found an eﬀect of WM, this was only observed
in participants with a lower WM capacity: burdening WM while performing
a conversational implicature task had no eﬀect on participants with a high
WM capacity. Finally, while a signiﬁcant eﬀect of WM was observed in
adults, Janssens and Schaeken () found no signiﬁcant WM eﬀect on
children’s understanding of conversational implicatures.
Taking these considerations together, we must be cautious in making
strong claims about the role of WM in conventional implicature processing.
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Moreover, the results obtained in this study reveal that children’s
understanding of the pragmatic meaning of but, so, and nevertheless is not
optimal yet and is still strongly determined by the content of the arguments.
This could indicate that the investigated age group may have been too young
(i.e. insuﬃciently capable of this task) to reveal signiﬁcant diﬀerences based
on age or WM. Therefore, it might be better to focus on older age groups in
future experiments, or to make a direct comparison between children and
adults. Furthermore, a diﬀerent approach might be considered to investigate
the role of WM. As in De Neys and Schaeken (), a double task design
could be used, in which WM is burdened with a secondary task while
performing the implicature task. A decrease of pragmatic answers under
WM load would indicate that conventional implicature processing does
require WM involvement.
In sum, this study’s main conclusion is that children’s pragmatic
understanding of but is not yet fully developed. Although they do seem to
grasp its meaning to a certain extent, the content of the arguments has a
very strong inﬂuence on their answers. Whenever one of the arguments is
clearly more plausible than the other, the meaning of but seems to be of
no importance.
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